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The Issue
Globalization is, in some senses, a very old phenomenon. Its
earliest roots are in the spread of humanity from a very local environment
to the far reaches of the earth, changing the flora and fauna, indeed the
air, water and soil wherever they went. And later, the globalizing effects of
such trade routes as the Old Silk Road, tied Asia to Europe, with shipping
links chat carried not only goods, but ideas, arts, technologies, seeds,
weapons, diseases, plus religious convictions from East to West and West
to East, with trader paths extending south to Semitic and African regions
and north to Slavic and Nordic regions, centuries before Christ and lasting
well into the West's Middle Ages. The lacer story is better known: sailing
ships with new methods of navigation brought exploratory, military,
colonial and missionary activity to these and still other regions, and
eventually to the New World. Each of these developments increased the
rapidity of the globalizing process, anticipating what is happening now.
However, the current form of globalization is new, in part
because of its magnitude and in part because if its character. It is not only
expanding our sense of the public world, it is creating a material infrastructure on a scale chat could eventuate in a world civilization with a
common virtual world of images and information that is, in principle,
accessible to all. To be sure, some people still think of the "public" only as
having to do with policies, but globalization is not a government project,
and no political regime can comprehend the public it engenders. Indeed,
the emerging global institutions of regulation and development, such as
the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, etc., transcend any government's
program. In fact it is a frequent accusation against chem chat they are
unregulated by any political order and are too much influenced by the
interests of multinational economic interests.
More frequently, people think of globalization primarily in terms
of the international spread of these corporations and of capitalism more
generally, which they usually understand in terms derived from either
neo-Marxist categories of class-conflict (now less the international proletariat vs bourgeoisie than the "first" vs the "third" worlds or the "North"
vs the "South" or "The West" and "The Rest"), in which the exploited or
developing peoples of the world stand against the Neo-liberal
"Washington Consensus" (laissez-faire economics which they often
identify with Adam Smith, backed by American neo-imperialist power).
Neither Marxist nor the Neo-liberal are today generally trusted to lead the
world to a better future, even if many feel that they somehow ought
morally to side with the proletarian "Rest" against the American-led
"West". The distrust derives from the suspicion that the one always seems

co move toward a system that cannot efficiently produce, and the other
always seems to move toward a system that does not (or will not) equitably distribute, and both seem to violate the ecosystem. 2
Such views are partially right, for many countries which have
suffered from colonialism and have emerged from it by strong nationalist
movements find now chat their national political efforts to control their
own destinies are compromised by the trans-nationalist efforts to extend
the international economic interests that are at work in globalization.
Further, in the perception of many, the gap between the rich and the
powerful on the one hand and the poor and the powerless on the other
seems to increase. I say "seems to" for the hard evidence for chat is inconclusive, controverted, and subject to interpretation by ideological use of
the data. As I read it, very high percentages of the world's population are
moving up economically, and while some are moving much more rapidly
than ochers, and large numbers are being left behind, the most remarkable
change is the emergence of new middle classes increasingly demanding a
voice in their societies and expressing a concern for the environment.
These new middle classes are being created precisely in those countries
which have most energetically opened themselves to global influences,
while the greatest poverty remains in those countries most closed to or
inaccessible co globalizing forces. 3 It appears to be so chat the peak percentages of those who are at the very top of income and wealth distribution are further removed from those at the bottom than at any time in
recent history, this is in part a function of the fact that more and more
countries of the world have decided chat private institutions do a better
job of forming and deploying capital than do states. Meanwhile, those
governments chat seek to control economies are being reshaped by global
influences, and the rather raw forms of mercantilism posing as capitalism
have, in authoritarian environments, increasingly replaced communism as
the economy of choice, aiding local development somewhat but increasing
inequality. The shifts are effecting every subsistence, feudal, and socialist
economy, and making the meager skills of the least developed peoples
obsolete. It is not a pretty picture, although it is likely to be cemporary. 4
Nevertheless, more determinative forces than purely economic
ones are at work in technology, medicine, law, and education, forces that
make the economic changes viable, and through the complex of developments, as Roland Robertson has famously said, "the whole world is
becoming one place." It is now an inclusive field of spaces, peoples,
cultures, institutions, practices and activities chat leaves no context
untouched. Every contextual mode of analysis now must take account of
chis comprehensive context, and each local context is "glocalizing" as
aspects of the global forces indigenize and as people from local societies
2

are drawn into wider frames of reference, drifting, for example into the
exploding mega-cities of the earth and becoming part of the ganglia of the
growing global network of interaction, information, exchange, and c
reativity. All this, is not, however, homogenizing culture, as many fear;
for as local and global influences interact, new pluralizing syntheses are
being worked out. People re-invent their traditions, selectively adopting
practices, values, clothing, cuisines, and technical resources from "foreign"
societies and from their own traditions, as presumed universals become
modulated by being indigenized and flowering in new ways in local soils
and newly constructed syntheses. All of this has as many implications for
religion, as religion does for the dynamics themselves. 5
Those who see globalization only as an economic development
extending rapacious capitalism or only as a current political development
chat tends toward a new imperialism are viewing the realities all can see
too narrowly, for these frequent ways of interpreting these changes are
rooted in dubious interpretive understandings of how history works. The
glasses most frequently used to read the situation need re-grinding, and
this is one of the key tasks of intellectuals who wrestle with the empirical,
the ethical and the spiritual realities of chis new socio-historical context.
Seen through other lens, the decisive current changes are largely derivative
of dynamics chat are obscured by the older spectacles. I refer specifically
to the impact of religious and theological developments that are reversing
the number of presumptions about how history works, such as the view
that the world is "progressively" becoming more secular and chat the "real"
forces chat drive development are always material - economic or political. 6

In fact, old religious traditions have gradually re-worked their
way co dominant influence, and new constellations of resurgent religion
are interacting as cultural forces with political, economic realities to form
a myriad of new combinations of local and global syntheses - in what
Berger and Huntington have identified as "many globalizations." 7
Together they generate a vast, world-wide complex of extremely diversified, highly unpredictable, rapidly changing, dynamics that comprehend
and transform every particular contextual reality and creates the fragile
prospect of a global civilization, one more complex and differentiated than
the world has ever known, one chat adopts traditional diversities into its
ever-extending net, one that has no obvious singularly coherent center.
This is what we must try co understand both to know what is going on
and to find the handles to guide the development responsibly, so far as
possible.
The main purpose of chis paper is precisely this: to draw upon
neglected resources, largely from religious insights, chat enable us to refine
3

the ways by which we can understand the various powers and spheres of
life that are emerging under globalizing conditions and to relate these to
the fundamental bases of ethics in such a way that it can and should guide
our responses to chis very complex reality. This implies that to grasp and
guide current global dynamics we must seek a viewpoint that in some
sense transcends the world itself, one that allows us, at least in a thought
experiment, to see something of the whole. The indispensable social
sciences that study chis phenomenon seldom recognize the fact that religious and ethical forces are profoundly behind much of what is going on,
or chat they, even more than these sciences themselves, seek to grasp things
whole. Bue we cannot see the swamp and know it is a swamp simply by
immersing oneself ever the more deeply in it. We need perspective plus an
intimate familiarity with a variety of habitats. Then we can begin to recognize the multiplicity of forces chat made chis environment different
from other ones and set forth hypotheses as to how life works everywhere.
To understand a world phenomenon, one needs a worldview, what some
call a "metaphysical-moral vision" of the world, which is ever, at least in
part, a matter of faith - the kind of faith that is able to present publically
examinable arguments that it is a viable one to hold.
I am suggesting, in other words, that a theological view, one that
is rooted in a comprehending view that relativizes every particular context
in principle without violating the particularities found, has slowly produced what is now appearing before us in both material and virtual reality.
Key motifs from the legacy of the Hebraic, and thus also of the Christian
theological, heritage (and, in certain respects of derivative Islamic traditions), knew long ago of a single created realm where all peoples lived in a
multiplicity of contexts under a singular divine law and toward a variety of
divinely appointed ends in history and beyond. Parallel ideas were to
some degree present in tribal, Taoist, Confucian and classic Greco-Roman
philosophies, with parallels to some schools of theistic Hinduism,
although usually without the notion of a just and loving creator God as
the source and norm of the realities these traditions sought to interpret.
Many of these latter great traditions focused on the idea of Nature or
cosmic reality, not as a created artifact, but as the primal source and norm
of both society and religion. Thus, only some of the great world-views,
chose rooted in a transcendent God, have had a sense of a reality that is
other than the way things are and that nevertheless comprehends creation
and history. Even the view that modified the naturalistic sensibilities in
the West B the idea of one humanity with each made in God's image,
living in the one complex and sinful world, which the one yet triune God
created, commanded, and commissioned B is old and in principle universal, even if it is not acknowledged everywhere and by everyone. It
-
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points to a reality more public, more globally encompassing than any
particular political or economic system is, any culture can be, and, indeed,
than any naturalistic conception of the cosmos could imagine.
It is not only the case that religion is related to the dynamics of
globalization, it is the claim that something more powerful than nature is
behind the religious convictions of the world and that both that reality
and people's belief about it shape politics, economics and culture, and that
this reality is not, in any ordinary sense of the word, simply "natural". In
ordinary language, we refer to that reality as "God," and need to explore
whether and how God is related to globalization. Of course, even if
believers hold that God is behind all that goes on, we must admit that in
regard to globalization the connections, if true, are valid in very unsorted
ways. In my view, that is why our faiths and our theologies based on
them, and any social ethics legitimated by those theologies, must be
public. That is, they must not only take up global issues, in the sense that
it give us the motivation, courage and worldview to address the global
problems that are arising, but to discern, so far as we are able, any divine
intent, principles or purposes in the very phenomenon of globalization
and to evaluate the relative adequacy of various religious responses to
globalization - inso far as we can do so fairly.
Thus, I think we must speak not only of ethics for a much
expanded public, but of an ethic funded by a "public theology." I mean
by that, a kind of theology that generates a faith-full worldview, recovers
and recasts certain pertinent historic themes in the history of theology that
bear on globalization, and challenges any trends in theology that sees all
normative claims as privileged to specific gender, ethnic, social, or
convictional groups. It is widely held, today, that we each have our own
personal theology. Further, each communion of faith has its own confessional theology. The various streams and factions of the Christian tradition, for example, each has its own modes of thought, patterns of
worship, and ecclesiastical polity. All the various denominations can today
be seen as so many "orders," some of which seem to carry out their ministries best outside of the Mother Church. And yet, we can recognize the
family resemblance of these streams and factions, and that each shares
certain elements that are indispensable to the faith as a whole, even if not
always properly believed and practiced. Wherever these become predominant and enduring, they shape the common life and the wider worlds of
culture, politics and economics, and, indeed, begin to constitute those
great religio-social worldviews that shape civilizations. And when the ways
in which they do so have fundamental implications for all of humanity,
they become the focus of inter-religious deliberation and debate. Indeed,
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the most important way of studying these great religions is a critical public
theology, one deeply informed by comparative philosophy, ethics, and
social theory. This dimension of theology has only sometimes been
developed and propagated in our colleges and seminaries, in our ecclesiastical councils, and in our missionary efforts as they reached around the
world, yet it has become indispensable in a globalizing era. Exposure to
Christian worldviews, and indeed to the forces of globalization partially
prompted by them, has encouraged several of the other world religions to
articulate their faiths in revisionist terms that also approximate a public
theology.

It is important to develop a "public theology" today, because of
certain trends in contemporary religion to the contrary. One is the peril
of Fundamentalistic movements. The growth of lslamist conviction in the
Arabic world, of Hindu nationalism in India, of Buddhist militance in
Myanmar and parts of Japan, 8 of both pre-millennialist dispensationalism
and "Radical Orthodoxy" in Christianity tend to obscure the greater forms
of these traditions and to set the religious agenda for an inevitably "clash
of civilizations," to use the phrase Huntington made famous. 9 Another is
sectarianism, reinforced by the relativism of post-modern thinking, against
any thought of a master narrative. In Christian circles, this appears in a
misbegotten ignoring ofJohn 3:16-17, so that it is held that God sent
Christ into the world to save the church, and not the world, and that the
chief function of the church that follows Christ is to condemn the world.
It is of course a great thing to bring souls into the church and to
strengthen communities of faith, but this tendency is today being
advanced in Christian circles in ways that end up retreating from the
obligation of serious theology to also provide the moral and spiritual inner
architecture for shaping the common life, including today the globalizing
environment. Comparable tendencies are also a temptation of other world
religions - sometimes in the form of reactionary re-tribalization that wants
to freeze-dry local religio-cultural traditions against change or more
comprehensive views of reality. Still a third peril is the credibility of
many church leaders. I refer not only to sexual and financial scandals
that discredit religious leadership, but to the fact that few have sought to
develop a profound public theology able to address the questions that
globalization pose should be.
"Globalization" as a dynamic process suggests not only that the
whole world can be conceived as "one place," a single reality, but as a
reality involved in a process of change, so that will transcend its present
reality. It presumes an "already" and "old" nature, indeed a kosmos and
oikoumene, that are necessary and enduring, but incomplete, flawed,
-

6

unfinished, or distorted; and a "not yet," something "new," that is at least
promised and possibly coming into being. The question is whether this
may, or must, be seen as related to a divine intent. The New Testament
conveys just such views with an idea of "the world" as something that is
created by God and thus good, but which is fallen, distorted in its operations, incomplete and imperfect, and thus is something to which we are
not to conform, even though we cannot in this life depart from the
deepest structure of its very being without extinction. Yet, "the world" is
also something that God so loved that it is being redeemed, and those who
know God also know that they are sent into it, not to conform to it, but
to aid in its process of redemption, to become agents in its potential transformation toward a new creation and a new civilization. We are to
participate in the Kingdom that is within us and among us as it presses
and points toward a New Jerusalem, a symbol of a complex divine city to
which all the peoples of the earth bring their gifts.

the idyllic memories of a lost primal community. 12 And the technologies
that had made the new internationalism possible could generate both new
methods of productivity and economic interdependency and new possibilities of destructive weaponry, both of which in turn uprooted traditional
cultures. The "music of humanity," of which Farquhar spoke, was soon
disrupted by a cacophony of military marches and accompanied by the
percussion of bombs in history's shortest half-century, 1914-1946, and
history's shortest century, 1918-1989, when modern social, political and
economic ideologies, nearly all of them anti-religious, clashed in World
Wars, hot and cold. The most important transitions are seldom by
smooth progress, and almost never without resistence and storms of
threatened apocalypse.

Those who receive the vision of this promised reign of God are to
employ every moral means to make it actual. This cluster of convictions
has periodically become central to Christian conviction, and has emerged
into most intense consciousness when people find themselves experiencing
and seeking to guide massive social change. Where it has been strongest,
the intentional restructuring of the world, selves, and society by conversion, reconstruction, technology, and social transformation becomes a
moral duty. 10 That is a second reason why a public theology is required as
we consider globalization, for this cluster of convictions stands deep
behind the contemporary dynamics of globalization. In our best understandings of creation and redemption, we can see God at work in globalization. Indeed, at the World Missionary Conference of 1910, as the
effects of the new trans-continental cables were first being realized, and
the massive effects of industrialization and urbanization were visible to
nearly all, the great scholar and missionary, J. N. Farquhar, spoke for
many of those first recognizing the dynamic of what we now call globalization: "We have entered a new era.... The nations have become one city;
we buy each other's goods, ... we think each other's thoughts, ... we begin to
hear the music of humanity." 11

Yet, Farquhar's forecast turned out to be essentially true: the
pagan right and the secular left, the twin enemies of the democracy,
human rights, economic freedom, and the humane use of technology were
defeated. And each of these developments, which they opposed, were not
only stamped by strands of the Christian view of a universal faith, but
became instrumental in the defeat of these struggles to contain these
globalizing forces. & a result, history became increasingly planetary.
Now, no state can be fully sovereign, no economy whole within itself, and
no culture entirely self-contained, while religion is in resurgence everywhere. This is now the context in which we now think, work, pray and
play, and seek to carry out our vocations. It now comprehends many specific locales and sub-cultures only partially linked in a dynamic pluralism.
Life, is now not only simultaneously global and local, it is also ecumenical
and contextual, catholic and congregational, in part because we live in a
period of "the compression of the world," which, in spite of America's role
as a super-power, is not only multipolar politically (with temporary
hegemonies which lesser powers cooperate to restrain), but multi-cultural,
and increasingly linked technologically, economically, politically, culturally,
and morally - even if some are, at least for now, left out since it is all
happening, as John Paul II has pointed out, "over their heads" - a telling
phrase that indicates not only that they do not understand what is going
on, but that these developments as pressing down on them.

He echoed, then, what the biblical record promised; he failed to
see, however, how the powers generated by such developments could also
be distorted by sin into colonialism and imperialism, which accompanied
the missionary movement and modernization, and how the response to
these could also spur reactionary movements. Mixing peoples, cultures,
and religions offended both the neo-pagans and radical secularizers of the
last century. The radical right and the radical left attached sacred meaning
to their own "blood and soil" or class, and interpreted them in terms of

I fully recognize that the Unites States, as the only remaining
superpower, is tempted in this context to a new imperialism. We do not
yet know whether the world's only remaining superpower will become, by
choice or by accident, at least for a time the new hegemonic power following in the train of old Rome, the Germanic Holy Roman Empire,
the British Empire (in competition with Dutch, Spanish, French, and
German) that in the midst of the modern European balance of powers
kept a semblance of peace, fostered the economic development of the
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West, and, it must be said, eventuated in colonialism - if the nations with
dynamic cultures could not expand at home because they were constrained
by their neighbors, they expanded abroad in a series of competing empires.
But most Americans are not eager to take this role. They do not see ourselves as an empire, either solo or as one of several. They do not aspire to
rule the world, we don't want to take responsibility for every rogue nation
or petty tyrant, every ethnic war or territorial conflict, even if the role is
thrust upon us because the USA is the only serious military power and
because, since World War II, it has already established bases around the
world and other countries, living under the defense umbrella of American
troops and weaponry, have allowed their own military prowess to wither.
Besides, if we are to become a military power, it will cost. And there are
enough residues of isolationist Americanism around that people will not
want to pay for other people's problems. Most would prefer to be loved
and admired, and to get on with the business of business, expanding the
world economy and making everyone better off. Furthermore, the forms
of faith that in the past helped develop the inner moral architecture for
guiding public affairs have fallen silent or become ideological. Religion, in
the dominant evangelical modes that convertS souls and establishes local
megachurches, has no intrinsic social philosophy - although some are
turning to certain Roman Catholic or Reformed models. 13 And both the
"mainline" Protestant and radical Catholic voices focus on "liberation" in
all things, but do not specify how the institutional life of humanity could
be ordered. A new ''Americanist" cultural arrogance fills the gap.

"totems" and "taboos," or report on ideas of "fate," "fortune," "karma,"
"kismet," etc., as believed by one or another cultural and religious tradition, although they do not believe that any cosmic logic or supra-natural
force really determines behavior. Today, genetics, social location, and economic interests, plus various "isms" or "archetypal patterns" developed
through evolution are taken as explanations of the powers that make us do
what we do. All these tell us that we have no choice but to live out what
these powers dictate. Concerns about the powers vary from person to
person, culture to culture, and epoch to epoch; but they are always
present. Psychology, anthropology, and sociology must, I believe, face the
issues they pose; but only a theological view can touch the depths needed
to see what is at stake in globalization. And here we can see at least one
dimension of reality named by the ancient faith as "powers, principalities,
authorities, thrones, and dominions." These terms point toward the
driving energies that are real in social history and now again exposed by
globalization, for the traditions that ordered them are being fundamentally
deconstructed. But these "forces," these "powers" need redefinition.

What are we then to think and to do about such a situation?
Obviously, we must advocate for and provide resources through public
and private charitable channels to those who are left behind, and support
those who work directly with those left behind. Bur another level of intellectual and organizational work also needs to be done. And on this front,
the only way to grasp what is going on is to recognize the insight of the
world religions that life is not only governed by the material forces that
determine much of life - nature and the lusts for power, wealth and the
desire for things - but also by immaterial realities. I refer to those spiritual energies capable of evoking loyalties and channeling freedom that
grab our souls and possess the esprit de corps of our social organizations.
In many cultures and sub-cultures, people live in a world of enchanted
powers - a world populated by spirits that can be invoked, demons that
must be exorcized, or charms and curses that may be used. Elaborate
systems develop around these concerns, and every religion has adherents
who use even their faith in such ways, even if clergy discourage it. To be
sure, some "super-personal forces of good and evil" 1• are identified in other
terms by the modern social sciences. They speak of "complexes" or of

Among the most salient of the powers for our questions are what
we have called the "Principalities." Traditionally viewed as personified
angelic spirits that rebelled against their Creator and thus become distorted into demonic, idolatrous forms, and today viewed often as totally
impersonal psycho-social forces, the terms eros, mammon, mars, and the
muses point to inchoate, animating realities that are present in every
known society. They are, more or less, always ethically constrained, challenged or channeled by religion, which, if it successfully allowed a proper
place for them, tended to harness these powers so that they would contribute to an enduring civilization in which life can flourish. These
powers are constrained, challenged and channeled by the religious legitimation of institutional matrices that provide moral and spiritual housing
for them. Thus, normative forms of family life with their patterned ways
of relating males and females and parents and children channel eros, and
if this power is not channeled, family life and sexual behavior becomes
destructive, not constructive. Similarly, dominant arrangements of the
division of labor with modes of approved production and distribution
order mammon, and if these are woven into responsible institutional
orders, exploitation, corruption, and deception becomes the common coin
of economic life. In the same way, political authority with a legally and
morally bound power to exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion controls violence when it invades from abroad or erupts from within, but
unconstrained mars becomes unconstrained militarism. And culturedefining narratives and images (folk-tales; national epics; traditional
dances, painting, sculptural, architecture and musics) and whole languages
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with idioms provide possibilities of communication and the clarification of
meanings; but without a sense that the muses can be creative under higher
principles and purposes than to deconstruct meanings, they become a
babble of idolatrous frauds.
These are the primary spheres that are functional prerequisites of
existence in every society, necessary for viable community. They contain
and provide the social-ethical space for those powers that can grasp the
soul and become obsessive forces in the lives of people or sub-cultures becoming part of what the biblical tradition calls "the Principalities," as
already mentioned. None of the prevailing ways of constraining, challenging, and channeling the primal powers of eros, mammon, mars and
the muses - that is, family, economy, politics, and culture - are comprehensible without attention to the way these institutional spheres of life are
religiously shaped in every culture, and the fact that they nevertheless have
a tendency to assert their own potency and meanings against any constraining, challenging or channeling limits. To use biblical language, these
angelic powers can make idols of their own potency and thus become
demonic. One can no more understand the prevailing patterns of familial,
economic, political or cultural life in India without attention to
Hinduism, or in the Arabic world without attention to Islam, or the
East Asian world without reference to the Confucian tradition, or the
West without attention to Christianity than one can grasp the corrupt
subcultures of any of these lands when eros, or mammon, or mars, or the
muses become sovereign. If societies are disrupted by the destruction of
their religious core, or if a new attempt to reconstruct a religious core does
not provide for the constraint, challenging and channeling of these
powers, we can expect the rise of sexual, economic, military, and cultural
disarray. Moreover, we can expect fundamentalist and sectarian reactions
to the fact that the operating norms and values of the necessary institutions of ordinary life are increasingly cluttered with the chaos of moral
confusion. 15 They may not have solutions to the problems, but they may
see the problems before the primary custodians of the moral fiber of civilization do.

among them are the "modern" professions - education, law, medicine, and
engineering, especially bio-engineering, geo-engineering and socio-engineering - this third one is commonly called "management." We may call
these the ''Authorities" of modern life, for these practices and behaviors
have created spheres of life that are now populated by experts to whom
everyone turns in times of difficulty. They not only claim to understand
and help manage our erotic worlds, but our worlds of mammon, mars and
the muses when they seem disordered, but they also claim to posses and
know how to guide the "good" powers: scientia, ~, salus, and techne.
It is more than interesting that every culture has its own traditions for teaching and learning, procedures for adjudication of disputes or
criminal behavior, for dealing with birthing and healing, and developing
techniques for the principal activities of life. The teacher, initiator, guru,
or "master" is known in every society; so is the "judge" or "council, the
mid-wife and medicine-man, the craftsman and the experimenter; but
only some cultures have developed elaborate institutional forms for cultivating and extending the influence of these Authorities. In fact, only in
the West, specifically traceable to the ways in which the church interacted
with, and often against, royal authorities, do we find the development of
what is now commonly accepted around the world - the school and the
university independent of the crown, constitutions and courts above the
rulers, hospitals and clinics as non-governmental organizations, research
institutes and management training centers separate from the regimes of
the world, and professional associations differentiated from the nationstate. Historically, we can show that each of these areas was cultivated by
the church in a long and deep history as a part of a deep Christian sense
of vocation to serve God and the people. Indeed, when missionaries went
to other cultures, they not only sought to convert persons and establish
churches, but they introduced modern schools, constitutional law with
human rights, modern medicine and new technologies and modes of management. Now, each of these areas of activity and institutional order has
networks of professional associations that reach around the world. 16

One of the key realities of globalization is that this is happening
now, and it is happening essentially under the influence of another set of
powers that have developed a quite different set of institutional forms that
are, in substantial measure, instigators and carriers of globalization. The
powers that are behind these spheres of life may also be rather universal in
human experience, but unlike the "Principalities", however, these have
only sometimes developed distinct and highly influential institutional
matrices to advance them. These are more clearly "modern" historical creations, not naturally or necessarily present in all viable societies. Primary

However, in their modern form, these areas of thought and
activity have largely divorced themselves from any overt theological, and
sometimes from any overt ethical content. Science and the modern
research university have left religion largely behind, even if many scientists
and professors are religious and certain religious traditions are the womb
out of which science and the university were born. Medical training and
contemporary hospitals have a place for chaplains, more or less, and many
medical personnel may be religious, but the role of theology in the functional side of medical training, psychiatric treatments and health-care
delivery systems is marginalized - even at the local Mount Sinai, St.
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Mary's, or Presbyterian hospital. And the very idea that God's law, or any
divinely ordered natural law, or a universal moral law written into the
hearts of all, and the notion that lawyers are above all "called" to actualize
the "holy righteousness" of "justice" would be ridiculed in the first year of
law school. And so on one could go with the various forms of engineering; those on the cutting edge of technology seldom, if ever, see themselves obeying the divine command to have "dominion" over the earth, to
repair (so far as possible) the disruptions in creation brought by "the fall,"
and to use the gifts of "the mechanical arts" closer to the vision of the
New Jerusalem.
It is not that these spheres of professional life are entirely
immoral, it is that they represent fragmented and fragmenting understandings of reality that, when exported to other societies around the
world both attract for their competency and repel due to their spiritual
emptiness. In each of these areas, to be sure, new courses in professional
ethics are being developed or already being taught; but they seldom touch
the moral and spiritual depths necessary for guiding the modern professional. Besides, as the authorities of science, law, medicine, and technology are exported around the world, the theories they advance appear to
others as utterly devoid of morality, yet they disrupt the religious convictions and the ethos formed by indigenous religious traditions and
undercut spiritual and ethical bases of cultural life. The responses of fundamentalism, re-tribalization and moral sectarianism, or the use of the
marvelous technical resources of these authorities to exploit the environment and the people are quite understandable. Any one of these
authorities, can bring death to a society, as we saw in the holocausts and
gulags of the last century. And now, in our new global situation, it is a
serious question whether they can help form a new civilization - the need
of our time.

modern critiques. It is not that these authorities never serve humanity,
but the systematic exclusion of normative considerations in these fields
blocks out any consciousness of their own roots, guiding principles or
ultimate ends, and that means that they can easily become distorted, with
no inner spiritual gyroscope and no deep moral rudder to guide what they
do. The increased world-wide access to education brought by the missionary movement and institutionalized in modernity at the hands of the
state is one of its greatest triumphs of the last several centuries; but the
sense of "the dying of the light"' 7 among theological and ethical critics of
today's institutions of higher learning may not yet have produced the right
answers in every respect, but they signal a declining confidence in the fact
that a purely secular mode of learning is good for the increase of wisdom.
The legal development of constitutional law with guarantees of human
rights has brought the forms of modern political order to increasing
numbers of lands around the globe, and where these become deeply
rooted, the host cultures tend to flourish. But they do not become deeply
rooted if their basic presuppositions are not overtly stated and believed;
they become manipulated voting charades to mask and perpetuate
tyranny. So also with engineering: technological transfer can help economic development and reduce drudgery; but if the metaphysical assumptions behind modern technology, which are religious in nature, are not
acknowledged, and at least selectively embraced, the apparatus that technological transfer brings will be left to rust in the dust. Or, if they are
adopted as entirely morally neutral techniques, they can be used to build
weapons of mass destruction, to clone humanoids, to build grandiose
palaces or cathedrals temples or monuments to the glory of local warlords.

Both the ancient, perennial "Principalities" and the historic, cultivated ''Authorities" are "Powers" that were rooted in theological developments that can be identified with the common grace of creation and with
the historic grace of providence; but few "experts" in these areas see no
need for the special grace of salvation other than what they think they,
themselves, can supply. The leaders of the modern Authorities particularly
have gradually shed any sense of a need for that, and have become highly
ambiguous in their relationship to anything theological and thus about
any divinely rooted sense of calling to serve humanity. They have the
traces of these roots deep within them, although they celebrate their
autonomy and seek to supply their own foundations - a project that
Nietzsche saw through and that is now generally challenged by post-

It is doubtful that anything can provide the inner moral and spiritual fiber to these spheres than a theologically grounded ethic. Only a
way of thinking and believing that acknowledges a moral and spiritual
reality beyond what humans construct out of their interests and imagination can restrain the arrogant egoism of the elites and encourage the
weak and the victims to seek a better truth and justice than what they
offer. Indeed, the only power that has a chance of shaping, constraining,
challenging, and channeling these powers is religion, feeble as it appears to
be from the outside. But if we turn to this issue, we must consider the
third, and indeed the most important, set of "Powers" that are in globalization. If religion is a critical factor in understanding whence globalization came, and guiding its directions to that it becomes a blessing and
not a curse to humanity, what shall our theology entail, and what shall we
think of the world religions? How can we expect them to interact, and,
even more, how shall we treat them? The many dimensions of this
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question are now under heated debate about pluralism and the new subdiscipline of Theology of Religions. 18
Our question is this: since we can easily encounter a pluralism of
religions in a globalizing world, and we can choose among them, what
kind of religion shall we choose? Or, to put it another way for our issues,
what kind of religious orientation can provide the inner spiritual and
moral architecture for an immensely complex civilization, yet, while
setting the basic convictional skeleton of the new global civil society so
that it is both as meaning-full and as just as human societies can be, can
also keep the society sufficiently open that any who are not persuaded may
find a place of freedom and tolerance while they confess, practice, and
advocate some other religion or ultimate world-view.
At this point we must introduce the concept of the "Dominions,"
a word taken from the Latin for "Lord" - dominus. It makes a great deal
of difference whether the center(s) of human loyalty is. For that will
shape the socio-cultural decisions as to whom the regnant lord (or lords)
of the globalization process and the possible new civilization to which the
people around the world turn to guide their responses to globalization are.
This will determine what it is that guides the formation of the emerging
material basis of an interdependent economy, the new global civil society
that supercedes the nation-states of the world, and overarching features of
the increasingly common culture. Shall we turn to the Spirits of the
Elders and of Nature as we find them dominating every decision in life
among most traditional tribal peoples? Or shall we turn to the wisdom of
Master Kung as we find it in the classic Confucian empires of East Asia; or
the spirituality of Lord Krishna or Lord Shiva as we find them portrayed
in the great moral epics of the Indian sub-continent; or the stark
enlightened insights of Lord Buddha as he is honored in the temples of
South-East Asia, or the great warrior-Prophet Mohammed as followed in
the Arabic world; or Christ. 19 Or is it the case that a quasi-religious
Enlightenment-driven view of humanity and progress (neo-Liberal, evolutionary or revolutionary) can guide the future?

the academic approach to religion is often much like popular opinion in
this: many want the religions to be viewed as if they are all of equal worth
and a matter of personal background or choice, or of accidental cultural
development. The American experience, in which we try very hard not to
discriminate against persons whether they are Baptist or Catholic,
Presbyterian or Pentecostal, Muslim or Marxist, does not equip us to see
what is at stake in our global setting. This wonderfully tolerant perspective with regard to the faith of individual persons, which should be
spread across the globe, nevertheless hides the fact that each of the great
world religions in fact judges the kinds of persons the other religions tend
to produce and, even more, how the various religions structure marriage,
politics, culture, economics, and professional life - in short, how they
form civilizations. The question that this raises is whether we can identify
any more valid or less valid forms of religious belief and practice specifically both as they reflect the true divine reality and as they shape persons
and the Powers of the common life. People do make such judgments, but
the decisive question is whether we can evaluate the "Lords" fairly and
wisely, at least in terms of their ability to shape a viable global civilization?

All these religiously formed civilizations, in varying degrees and
with varying degrees of effectiveness, have formed institutional nerworks
that order and guide the Principalities, and many have developed sophisticated ways of dealing with what we here call the Authorities, at least in
their early forms. But sooner or later, we have to ask what kinds of civilizations they lead to (in principle and in fact) and what kinds of justice,
cultural and intellectual vitality, economic prosperity and spiritual
integrity they foster. Yet to pose these questions can be explosive, and
much study of religions is "non-theological" and "non-evaluative." Indeed,

Tribal peoples have formed societies under the influence of traditional religions that could integrate patterns of family, economic, political,
and cultural life in specific niches. These religions and patterns of life
never completely disappear, but in the long story of globalization, they
have been increasingly absorbed into cultures formed by the so-called
"high" religions - Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and, of
course, Christianity. In fact Hindu missionaries are today actively working
among the tribal peoples of India, Islam is expanding among tribal peoples
in equatorial Africa, and Christianity continues to grow in southern
Africa, Latin America, in south and south-east Asia. These larger, more
complex religions have in turn formed highly complex and differentiated
societies, with refined systems of education, law, medicine and technology
for, at least, elite males; but nearly always they have formed commandsocieties that are ruled from the top down. They have, to be sure, done
this in different ways: Confucian-influenced societies since the Han
dynasty substantially unified the tribes of China, almost always find their
center in the Emperor, with educated elites serving both as bureaucratic
administrators and as priestly advisors under and for him, and their subordinates working among the people. At the lower levels the father of each
extended family serves as the little emperor over his household. All are to
work to order the whole of society into a single, integrated unit that is in
harmony with heaven and earth. All outsiders - including remaining
ethnic minorities in their little niches, Tribal Muslim in the northwest or
Tibetan Buddhists in the southwest, plus today the Falun Gong and
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Independent Christians - are expected to give it honor and pay it tribute,
with a heavy price if they do not. That vision has been perpetuated under
Chinese Communism, with the Chairman replacing the Emperor, in title,
and the party ideologists replacing the Mandarin literati. We can get a
glimpse of what a globalized world would look like, should this deep tradition become the model of the emerging world order, and today China is
enthusiastically globalizing faster than any other developing country, cautiously confident that it can adapt modern forms of education, law, medicine and technology into a new solidarity with Chinese characteristics.
Ironically, however, the desire for technology of computers with its new
access to the internet, the formation of independent corporations as statemanaged economic institutions falter, and the agreements to international
law not controllable from the center, for instance when China joined the
WTO, introduce profoundly different value systems that could be indigestible and modify the system; but many intellectuals see the adoption of
these into the Chinese way of preparing China to become the world's next
superpower, to which all will pay tribute.
The Hinduism of India presents a different possibility. It has not
homogenized the tribal peoples and ethnic groups of India into a single
people under the rule of an imperial series of dynasties, it has stacked
them one on top of another in a very distinct hierarchy of communal
identities, the famous "caste system." It is quite proper to call this system
hierarchical, for the root meaning of the term (heiros) has to do with the
rule of the priests, and at the top of the Indian system are the Brahmans.
In large measure, they and their subordinate allies, the warriors and governing classes of every province and region, control the educational,
media, and ideological systems that guide cultural, legal, political and economic policies. The caste system is troubling to Christians (and Marxists)
in India, and generated new forms of radical grass-roots action among the
Dalits - those groups who used to be called "outcastes" or "harijans."
These groups have adopted ideas of normative human equality from
Christianity and from the Enlightenment, and while India has become the
world's largest democracy in the sense that all qualified adults can vote and
a free press is vibrant, the view that society should not be hierarchical
simply does not register. New Dalit-governed institutions, including large
sections of the Christian church, remain decidedly hierarchical. Of
course, say leading Hindu advocates, every civilization is governed by
dominant spiritual ideals, and any empirical look at humanity will reveal
that every society is constituted by ethnic and culturally defined relative
approximations to those ideals, and the classic Hindu recognition of
natural hierarchy is the way things really ultimately are. To deny this is to
deny reality. This is one of the great, enduring world-models of how to
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organize a complex civilization, and India is the second most rapidly
globalizing land on earth, dominated by an amazingly rich and complex
religious heritage.
This heritage was, in considerable substance, repudiated by
Buddhism, which nevertheless preserved many of the devotional practices
and social attitudes that stood at the margins of Hindu thought.
Especially important are two developments - the radical focus on the state
of spiritual consciousness in the individual person, rather than in the
social status and duties given by birth and social rank; and the acceptance
of the leadership of royalty in all external matters. Buddhism, thus, tends
toward a "two-agent" theory of reality - the self must deal with the inner
world, detaching the mind and heart from those worldly desires and
attachments that bring suffering; and the king must deal with the outer
world, prudently providing an ordered environment where laity and nonbelievers can form their families, grow their crops, do their business, and
cultivate their inner detachment from the material distractions of the
earth. This tradition has, thus, been attracted to and attractive of kingly
support, and rulers often see the monasteries and temples, which they
build, as providing a haven for spiritual growth among the spiritually sensitive, and an opportunity for any who make offerings to them to share in
their merit. This model has been most profoundly developed, in different
ways, in Sri Lanka, Indochina, Tibet, and pans of China and Japan; but
its social forms are under threat everywhere and it has not produced
dynamic cultural or economic developments that clearly can contribute to
a global future. It inevitably adapts to the authority structure of its host
culture. However, Buddhism as a personal spiritual discipline and quest
has contributed enormously to many persons, and, heavily to post-Jewish
and post-Christian intellectuals in the West, including many who hold
"new age" perspectives and basically trust a secular, liberal democracy to
solve social problems, for it provides a richer spiritual psychology than that
developed by much of modern Western psychology, which it holds to be
the decisive religious issue.

As critically as we may look at these options, here all-to-briefly
sketched, we have to admit that the social visions most systematically
identified with Master Kung, Lord Krishna, and Lord Buddha are not
entirely alien to parts, pieces, and periods of Christian history. Those
deep, now obscure battles between popes and emperors, bishops and
kings, monk and patriarch in our Western social history parallels these
alternatives in substantial measure. The ideal of the Constantinian empire
approximated the Chinese model of a ruling empire, with priests as its
chaplains and agents, a model not far from those worked out in some of
the Eastern Orthodox Christian traditions, as well as that of the Anglican
18

establishment after Henry VIII. At other times, rulers deferred to the
authority of the curia, while the bishops' estates, social prestige and artistic
patronage were large, and populist, crusading armies marched at the
command of religious leaders - not far removed from the Hindutva movements in India. And, in a general sort of way, the Buddhist division
between inner spirituality and external deferment to political authority
parallels some developments that have taken place in Christian Evangelical
thought, from Luther to contemporary neo-Evangelicalism. None of these
are likely to fade soon; but it is also doubtful that they can offer a compelling and just vision for our global future.
Of course, Islam is the other great non-Christian tradition, and it
does have a profound vision of the world, and it has a sense of its Godgiven duty to bring the whole world under its rule. While millions of
believers have found a way to understand God and the purposes of life
through this great tradition, our task here is to identify, so far as we are
able, its possible contribution to the ordering of a global future. As I
understand it, Islam can be said to be essentially theocratic in socialpolitical conception; heavily legalistic in its understanding of how to order
the practice of the religion, the conduct of personal life, and the ordering
of the common life, and, although I must say this with due caution, primarily fundamentalistic in its view of the authority of its holy scripture.
In this regard, it is similar to certain developments in the Judaism of the
ancient world, and to Protestant fundamentalism as it developed especially
in the last century or so in America. We are today in the process of trying
to understand whether these features of Islam are intrinsic to it, or
whether they are contemporary eruptions in Islam, as their parallels have
been in both Judaism and Christianity. And while it is wrong for any
regime to declare war on any religion, as all of the religions here mentioned had done at one time or another, it is unlikely that the present
powers of the world will allow this vision to come to dominate the global
future.
Christians, of course, think that the true Lord has been revealed
in time and life, as well as in the very structure and dynamics of creation
and the moral law written on the hearts of each person, and that in Jesus
Christ we can see what the character of a true and just lordship that establishes dominion, but not domination, really is. This draws us into discipled patterns of service and purpose that are able to transform our
hearts, minds, and relationships, and to alter the regencies of the world of patriarchal elders, of emperors, of priestly hierarchies, of royalty, and of
theocrats. The issue is whether Christ's Lordship can today reframe the
Powers, strengthening the Principalities under new conditions, and compellingly call the Authorities to rediscover and revitalize their spiritual and
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moral roots so that they may enhance a common domain of disciplined
service to God and humanity. And can this Lord also reshape the other
Dominions too? Can He help them find ideas of new possibilities in their
own traditions and lift them into new levels of relationship, mutuality, and
ethical coherence? We do not know for certain, but we can glimpse parts
of the vision that we can pray will come to prominence.
Two great models of what Christianity offers on this front have
been developed, and a third is acknowledged as helpful in certain respects.
The idea of covenant is among the central concepts of the biblical tradition, and was long understood in biblical times to be the paradigmatic,
providential way of structuring the institutions of the common life in
accord with God's law and purposes while simultaneously pointing all
spheres of society toward redemptive possibilities. That connection needs
to be recovered and recast for our contemporary situation. 20
There are, of course, different forms of covenant, implied already
in the different terms in the Hebrew bnai berit and baalei berit, for
example, and in the ways they are translated and adapted into other cultural-linguistic contexts: diatheke and sometimes syntheke or even mysterion
(Greek), testamentum, compactum, sacramentum, or foedus (Latin), in the New
Testament and early Christian writings, and later in social, political, and
legal thought as pact, compact, federation, confederation, Bund (German;
"bond" or "bounden duty" in old English), alliance (French), and thus
holy league, agreement, or mutual promise, to name the most frequent
usages in western languages. I list all these meanings so that we can note
the frequency and social overtones of these terms and see how pervasive
and thick with implications the idea can be. All these terms refer to a
God-given capacity to voluntarily "bond" persons, peoples, or institutions
into communities of commitment that otherwise would remain in isolation or conflict. Covenant forms a matrix of interacting consociations
that makes peace, justice, mutual obligation and care more probable,
because all persons and parts of the complex, diversified social system see
themselves under a divinely given and grace-full higher moral law and
called to a more ultimate purpose in life, one that serves God's purposes
for humanity beyond mere survival or success. This is the basic pattern
behind the great ecumenical councils and synods of Christian history.
Indeed, in every genuine covenant, six elements are present: The Divine is
disclosed in the midst of history. Mutual promises are made. A new community of confederated communities is formed. Duties and rights are
accepted. Freedom and justice are made constitutional. And a vision of a
new, holy future for civilization is opened to and for all.
Covenant has sometimes been interpreted in tribalistic or nation20

aliscic ways. But under Christ's dominion, it not only surpasses chose, but
contrasts with two other models chat have become decisive in many cultures. One is the hierarchical-subsidiary model chat has become central to
the Catholic tradition, with its parallels, as mentioned, to aspects of the
Confucian and Hindu models. And the ocher is the individualistic-contractual one, which was part of the old structure of Roman law, developed
further by the Enlightenment social philosophies, and was largely accepted
by the French Revolution's view of the social contract in one form and by
the Industrial Revolution's view of commercial contracts in another. Boch
have elements chat potentially overlap with the covenant idea, and in some
aspects of life each of these two has a distinct role. Each can become a
form of grace.

In my view, we need to have a rebirth of the confederation model
of covenant, one that recognizes the relative role of hierarchical leadership
and subsidiarity and of temporal contracts in particular contexts. I
emphasize chis matter today, for it appears char the United States, rooted
in the covenant idea as it generated our constitutional democracy, may
now be assuming the role of an imperial power, and celebrating, or even
imposing, the commercial contractual model on all human relationships.
But if the United States does presume to become the policeman of the
world, it had better know what model it is adopting and why, how it is
going co relate to the ocher models, and whether it wants to bring creative
forms of grace or impose arbitrary will. The forms of state power and
individualistic self-celebration that are so prominent today, are unlikely to
suffice either in forming alliances to discern and enforce just principles or
in providing a graceful vision for the shape of a pose-war world, should
chat become an eventuality.

If the global trends continue, and are modified and adopted, even
if begrudging by the peoples of the world, we can say chat not only would
the confederated covenantal model of the common life find a new arena of
incarnation that has implications for the emerging global civil society, but
chat globalization, understood in its more complex meanings, could be
"for good" -- both lasting and for human well-being. It could promote a
highly pluralistic global civilization with increased prospect for peace with
justice. In the final analysis, however, it is unlikely co happen unless it
finds its focus in Christ as Lord, for Christ is the one who has, and can
ever and again, renew the covenant between God and humanity, and point
souls toward reconciliation with God and neighbor, and societies coward a
New Jerusalem. This, in my view, does not mean that everyone in the
world must become Christian; but it does mean that both non-Christian
and many Christian traditions may have to be modified in chis direction
on this point - just as many have adopted the principles of Human
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Rights, which historically derive from nowhere else than from certain
streams of the Christian heritage. Of course, such a modification cannot
be forced, it has co be adopted on its moral and spiritual, as well as its
practical merits. Yet we might want to acknowledge chat for some, such a
modification would mean something like a modest conversion of the traditions. This would, or could, become a means of grace to and for the
world in a structural sense.
One other motif needs to be mentioned as I draw to a conclusion
- a motif that needs further development and joint study. This is the
notion that under such a confederaced-covenantal system, individual
persons, especially chose in the bureaucratized modern authorities, the
proliferating professions of the global world, have to be prepared to see
their moral and spiritual way through the complexities of these new areas
of life, and to integrate chem, better than is often done at chis rime, into
patterns of ordinary family, culcural, and daily economic existence. In
brief, both the Principalities and the Authorities of modern life have to be
drawn again into a deeper sense of vocation than now appears to be the
case.
This, I propose, is one of the great responsibilities of the church
and parallel religious communities in our time. We need public rheological educational programs at all levels, from religiously informed ethics
courses in the professional schools to rituals of commissioning chat invite
school teachers, pharmacists, law clerks, and lab technicians as well as scientists and professors, doctors and nurses, lawyers and judges, engineers
and researchers form both the internal value system around a valid and
vibrant religious conviction, and a sense of calling in regard to what they
do. This can and should cohere with other obligations that one has in life
- family, responsible use of financial resources, being a responsible citizen
and supporting cultural creativity, for instance. Some of chis has begun,
but it is still feeble and fractured. To mount such a project, a new ecumenical interaction of Protestant notions of vocation and covenant with
Orthodox and Roman Catholic sensibilities about sacrament and rite and,
even more, with classic understandings of formation and genuine
catholicity will have to be culcivaced. Of course, chis would mean calling
upon an insecure clergy to renew itself, and to cake on questions and
issues chat have, in recent centuries, often been far from their training or
self-understanding. Still, it remains a growing conviction of mine, fueled
by intellectual struggle with the issues posed by globalization, char chis
must be done for the well-being of the peoples of the earth. These too
would, or could, be forms of grace for our day.
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